Government documents reviewed for this report show a pattern of regulatory concern stretching back years over the condition and management of Peru’s main natural gas pipeline, which transports roughly 95% of the country’s gas. The March rupture - which forced TGP to cut deliveries by nearly 90% and prompted a 14-day state of emergency - occurred after regulators had issued multiple warnings about landslides, soil erosion and construction-related weaknesses along the route.
Records from two regulators - the environmental overseer OEFA and the energy and mines regulator OSINERGMIN - include over 75 reports since 2005. Those records document at least 13 separate failures on the system and repeatedly flag insufficient steps taken by pipeline operator Transportadora de Gas del Peru (TGP) to monitor unstable terrain, control erosion and carry out needed repairs.
The rupture in March affected a 730-kilometre (453-mile) pipeline that begins at the Camisea gas field in the Amazon and traverses the Andes before reaching the coastal region that includes Lima, the country’s largest population center. The disruption to supply led authorities to urge remote work where possible and move schools to distance learning during the emergency.
TGP has said the leak originated in a component associated with a valve in the liquid line at a valve station in the Megantoni district of Cusco and that it occurred during a programmed preventative inspection. The company indicated that investigations remain ongoing and that, on the basis of currently available objective information, the event began with a leak in that system component. TGP also stated that prior to the inspection there had been no indications of anomalies in the pipelines or adjacent facilities.
However, the government records point to prior incidents at the same facility. An OSINERGMIN annual report from 2020 documented a serious leak at that identical valve station, noting that in response TGP installed a temporary two-pipe bypass and replaced the valve.
Recurring ruptures and known geotechnical hazards
The line has a history of ruptures dating back to its start of service in 2004. It experienced five ruptures in the first three years of operation, a spate of early incidents that led to a congressional inquiry in 2006. Several subsequent failures have occurred in terrain that regulators have classified as unstable or prone to landslides and erosion.
Notably, a 2016 incident took place along the same Megantoni stretch where the March rupture happened. Documents indicate regulators then concluded that TGP internally considered that area to be "high risk" but had not installed sufficient reinforcements or drainage systems. A separate 2012 event occurred just 130 meters from the 2016 site, yet the records say the company did not follow up with geotechnical investigations or put in place an adequate monitoring system after that occurrence.
Since 2015, TGP has invoked declarations of force majeure in five separate incidents, citing natural events or security-related constraints as reasons it could not meet delivery obligations. The records show government authorities rejected those force majeure claims, finding in each case that the company had not taken adequate measures to mitigate known risks.
Following a 2018 rupture near the pipeline’s gathering area, OEFA reported that TGP had been aware of recurring landslide issues in that location since 2004 but still had not implemented sufficient monitoring or slope stabilization measures.
Inspections, temporary fixes and regulator findings
OEFA’s scrutiny has highlighted that many of the failures on the country’s parallel 540-kilometre (335-mile) natural gas liquids line were due to landslides, soil creep or erosion. A November 2019 OEFA sanction noted that 11 of 13 failures on that parallel line were caused by these geotechnical hazards, which regulators categorized as high risk across multiple pipeline stretches.
In multiple instances, documentation shows TGP’s own inspections identified ground cracks within meters of locations where ruptures subsequently happened. Company reports describe sealing surface cracks with a polyethylene film called "agropol" on roughly 300 occasions to prevent water infiltration and erosion. OEFA criticized the practice as systematic patching that lacked in-depth geotechnical analysis and that was used instead of more robust prevention measures.
Regulators further noted that the same plastic materials were found in the landslide responsible for the 2018 rupture. Reports from PMAC, a local community environmental monitor, recorded drainage failures in the area dating to 2015.
TGP has not provided responses to questions about whether it continued to use plastic coverings such as agropol to address cracks, nor about what steps it has taken to address geological hazards more broadly. The company also did not reply to questions about exposed sections of the pipeline or the qualifications of maintenance personnel working when the March rupture occurred. OSINERGMIN and OEFA did not respond to requests for comment on the ongoing investigation into the March event.
Ownership, regulatory exchanges and broader implications
TGP is owned by a consortium that includes EIG Global Energy, Spain’s Enagas and Algeria’s Sonatrach. The operator asked OSINERGMIN to extend a 15-day deadline to present a force majeure report after the March rupture, but the regulator declined that request in late March. EIG, which acquired a 49.9% stake in TGP in December, did not respond to requests for comment. Enagas and Sonatrach also did not reply immediately to requests for comment.
The breakdown and its regulatory record have heightened concerns over Peru’s energy security, an issue that the documents indicate is increasingly sensitive in the weeks leading up to the country’s general election in June. The March rupture thus not only disrupted deliveries and daily life during the emergency but also reopened scrutiny over longstanding maintenance and risk-management practices along a pipeline that is critical to the national gas supply.