Overview
U.S. intelligence agencies have reported lingering doubts about whether interim Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez will carry out a clear break with countries Washington considers adversaries, according to multiple people familiar with the intelligence. Those reports, compiled in recent days, indicate it remains unclear if Rodriguez will formally sever relations with nations such as Iran, China and Russia - a key objective of the Trump administration in its efforts to limit foreign influence in Venezuela.
U.S. expectations and public posture
U.S. officials have said publicly they expect Venezuela’s interim government to expel diplomats and advisers representing nations that Washington views as adversaries. The objective is to reduce the presence and influence of foreign partners who have maintained close ties with Venezuela, with the broader goal of opening the country to expanded U.S. investment, particularly in its oil sector.
Rodriguez has not made any public announcement indicating she will take those steps. Her swearing-in earlier this month was attended by representatives of Iran, China and Russia, among others. That attendance has underscored to U.S. analysts the ambiguity surrounding Rodriguez’s intentions.
Intelligence assessments and U.S. engagement
The U.S. intelligence reports, described by people familiar with them, conclude it is not clear whether Rodriguez is fully aligned with Washington’s strategy for Venezuela. Sources who spoke about the assessments declined to be identified by name. CIA Director John Ratcliffe traveled to Caracas on January 15 and discussed the country’s political future with Rodriguez. It remains unclear from the intelligence whether those discussions altered agencies’ judgments.
A senior Trump administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the U.S. President "continues to exert maximum leverage" over Venezuela’s leaders and "expects this cooperation to continue." The Central Intelligence Agency and the Venezuelan government did not respond to requests for comment.
Why severing ties matters
Washington’s goal of reducing the presence of Iran, China and Russia stems from concerns about their strategic influence in the Western hemisphere. In Venezuela, those relationships have had tangible dimensions: Tehran has aided in repairing oil refining infrastructure; Beijing has accepted oil shipments as partial debt repayment; and Moscow has supplied weaponry, including missiles, to Venezuela’s military. The Trump administration has also named Cuba among U.S. adversaries it wants to see distanced from Venezuela, citing Havana’s security and intelligence support and its subsidized access to Venezuelan oil.
U.S. officials view breaking those ties as a prerequisite to expanding U.S. economic involvement in the country’s energy sector. They calculate that a formal rupture would create more opportunities for U.S. investment in Venezuela’s oil reserves. Conversely, failure to secure Rodriguez’s full cooperation could limit Washington’s ability to steer Caracas’s interim leadership through diplomatic means and could increase the risk that the U.S. might be drawn into a larger military role.
Rodriguez’s actions since taking power
Rodriguez assumed the interim presidency after the U.S. captured former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on January 3. Since then, she has taken several measures that U.S. officials have cited as signs of responsiveness to Washington. Actions include releasing political prisoners and authorizing the sale of between 30 million and 50 million barrels of oil to the United States. Yet she has also voiced opposition to what she framed as outside interference, saying in a public speech that she has had "enough" of U.S. intervention.
U.S. officials have maintained lines of communication with Rodriguez, holding both positive and challenging conversations in recent days, according to sources familiar with those contacts. Still, the administration does not see an immediate alternative to working with Rodriguez because of Washington’s strong public backing for her role.
Contingency planning and outreach
At the same time, U.S. policymakers have continued to cultivate relationships with senior military and security figures within Venezuela as a contingency measure, one source briefed on Venezuela policy said. These contacts are being developed in case U.S. leaders reassess their approach toward the interim government.
Maria Corina Machado as a future option
Recent intelligence assessments also evaluated opposition leader Maria Corina Machado. The reports concluded she is not presently in a position to govern effectively, in part because she lacks deep ties to the security apparatus and to the oil sector, two levers widely considered critical for governing Venezuela successfully. Machado’s supporters argue she won a 2024 election by a large margin, though the state declared a Maduro victory. She remains a popular figure among segments of the Venezuelan population.
The White House has expressed interest in Machado’s involvement in Venezuela’s leadership. President Trump told reporters last week that he wanted Machado "involved" without offering further detail. One person familiar with discussions between the administration and Machado described her as well-liked by senior U.S. officials and viewed as a longer-term possibility to take on a leadership role. Another source briefed on policy suggested she might be considered for an advisory post for the moment, although no final decision had been reached. Machado’s representatives did not respond to a request for comment.
Implications and open questions
The intelligence ambiguity about Rodriguez’s willingness to break ties with Iran, China, Russia and Cuba leaves open several possible paths for U.S. policy. If Rodriguez acts to expel foreign diplomats and advisors, U.S. officials see a clearer route for economic engagement in Venezuela’s energy sector. If she does not, Washington may face limits on its ability to influence outcomes from a distance.
Ultimately, the intelligence community’s current assessments reflect uncertainty rather than a firm conclusion about Rodriguez’s intentions. That uncertainty shapes both immediate diplomatic efforts and the broader calculus of how the U.S. will seek to limit external influence in Venezuela moving forward.